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Abstract
It has been realized that in order to solve the measurement problem,
the physical state representing the measurement result is required to
be also the physical state on which the mental state of an observer
supervenes. This introduces an additional restriction on the solutions
to the measurement problem. In this paper, I give a new formulation
of the measurement problem which lays more stress on psychophysical
connection, and analyze whether Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and
dynamical collapse theories can satisfy the restriction of psychophysical
supervenience and thus can indeed solve the measurement problem.
My analysis of the potential problems of the forms of psychophysical
supervenience required by Everett’s and Bohm’s theories suggests that
dynamical collapse theories might provide a promising solution to the
measurement problem. Finally, by further analyzing how the mental
state of an observer supervenes on her wave function, I also propose a
possible solution to the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse
theories.
1 Introduction
The measurement problem is a long-standing problem of quantum mechan-
ics. The theory assigns a wave function to an appropriately prepared physi-
cal system and specifies that the evolution of the wave function is governed
by the Schro¨dinger equation. However, when assuming the wave function
is a complete description of the system, the linear dynamics is apparently
incompatible with the appearance of definite results of measurements on the
system. This leads to the measurement problem. Maudlin (1995a) gave a
precise formulation of the problem in terms of the incompatibility. Corre-
spondingly, the three approaches to avoiding the incompatibility lead to the
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three main solutions to the measurement problem: Everett’s theory, Bohm’s
theory and dynamical collapse theories. It is widely thought that these the-
ories can indeed solve the measurement problem, although each of them still
has some other problems.
On the other hand, it has been realized that the measurement problem of
quantum mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem (Bar-
rett, 1999). In the final analysis, the problem is to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite experiences of
conscious observers. This requires that the physical state representing the
measurement result should be also the physical state on which the mental
state of an observer supervenes,1 thus introducing an additional restriction
on the solutions to the problem. However, this aspect of the measurement
problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation. Moreover, although
there have been some discussions on psychophysical supervenience in a par-
ticular solution to the measurement problem (e.g. Brown, 1996; Barrett,
1999; Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007), a systematic analysis of psy-
chophysical supervenience in all main solutions to the measurement prob-
lem seems still missing in the literature. In this paper, I will first give a
new formulation of the measurement problem which gives prominence to
the psychophysical connection, and then analyze whether each of the three
main solutions to the measurement problem can satisfy the restriction of
psychophysical supervenience, and thus can indeed solve the measurement
problem.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first introduce Maudlin’s
conventional formulation of the measurement problem, and then suggest a
new formulation of the problem which lays more stress on the aspect of psy-
chophysical supervenience. It is pointed out that the three main solutions to
the measurement problem correspond to three different forms of psychophys-
ical supervenience. In Section 3, Everett’s theory is analyzed. The theory
requires that the mental state of an observer cannot always supervene on
her whole wave function, and especially, for a post-measurement wave func-
tion it supervenes on certain branches of the wave function. It is argued
that this form of partial psychophysical supervenience seems problematic,
and resorting to decoherence may lead to a further problem. In Section
4, the problems of Bohm’s theory relating to psychophysical supervenience
are analyzed. It is argued that all three possible forms of psychophysical
supervenience meet difficulties. In particular, the seemingly well-accepted
form of psychophysical supervenience (i.e. the form that the mental state
supervenes only on the positions of Bohmian particles) may also lead to an
inconsistency problem besides the problem of allowing superluminal signal-
ing. In Section 5, dynamical collapse theories are analyzed. It is pointed
1In this paper I will not consider the possibility that there is no physical state repre-
senting the measurement result on which the mental state of an observer may supervene.
2
out that although these theories are favored by the above analysis of psy-
chophysical supervenience, they are also plagued by a few serious problems
such as the structured tails problem. A possible solution to this problem is
proposed based on a further analysis of how the mental state of an observer
supervenes on her wave function. Conclusions are given in the last section.
2 A new formulation of the measurement problem
According to Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation, the measurement problem orig-
inates from the incompatibility of the following three claims:
(C1). the wave function of a physical system is a complete description
of the system;
(C2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(C3). each measurement has a definite result (which is one of the possible
measurement results whose probability distribution satisfies the Born rule).
The proof of the inconsistency of these three claims is familiar. Suppose
a measuring device M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that
is in a superposition of two different x-spins 1/
√
2(|up〉S+ |down〉S). If (C2)
is correct, then the state of the composite system after the measurement
must evolve into the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being
x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M ). (1)
The question is what kind of state of the measuring device this represents.
If (C1) is also correct, then this superposition must specify every physical
fact about the measuring device. But by symmetry of the two terms in
the superposition, this superposed state cannot describe a measuring device
recording either x-spin up or x-spin down. Thus if (C1) and (C2) are correct,
(C3) must be wrong.
It can be seen that there are in general three approaches to solving the
measurement problem thus formulated. The first approach is to deny the
claim (C1), and add some additional variables and corresponding dynamics
to explain the appearance of definite measurement results. A well-known
example is Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952). The second approach is to deny
the claim (C2), and revise the Schro¨dinger equation by adding some non-
linear and stochastic evolution terms to explain the appearance of definite
measurement results. Such theories are called dynamical collapse theories
(Ghirardi, 2011). The third approach is to deny the claim (C3), and as-
sume the existence of many equally real worlds to accommodate all possible
results of measurements (Everett, 1957; DeWitt and Graham, 1973). In
this way, it may also explain the appearance of definite measurement results
3
in each world including our own world. This approach is called Everett’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett’s theory.
It has been realized that the measurement problem in fact has two levels:
the physical level and the mental level, and it is essentially the determinate-
experience problem (Barrett, 1999). The problem is not only to explain
how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the appearance of definite
measurement results obtained by physical devices, but also, and more im-
portantly, to explain how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the
existence of definite experiences of conscious observers. However, the mental
aspect of the measurement problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) formu-
lation. Here I will suggest a new formulation of the measurement problem
which lays more stress on the psychophysical connection. In this formula-
tion, the measurement problem originates from the incompatibility of the
following three claims:
(P1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
(P2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(P3). after each measurement an observer obtains a definite record
(which is one of the possible measurement records whose probability dis-
tribution satisfies the Born rule).
The proof of the inconsistency of these three claims is similar to the above
proof. Suppose an observer M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system
S that is in a superposition of two different x-spins, 1/
√
2(|up〉S + |down〉S).
If (P2) is correct, then the physical state of the composite system after the
measurement will evolve into the superposition of M recording x-spin up
and S being x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin
down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M ). (2)
If (P1) is also correct, then the mental state of the observer M will supervene
on this superposed wave function. Since the mental states corresponding to
the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M differ in their mental content, the
observer M being in the superposition (2) will have a conscious experience
different from the experience of M being in each branch of the superposition
by the symmetry of the two branches. In other words, the record that M
is consciously aware of is neither x-spin up nor x-spin down when she is
physically in the superposition (2). Therefore, if (P1) and (P2) are correct,
(P3) must be wrong.
By this new formulation of the measurement problem, we can look at the
three main solutions of the problem from a new angle. First of all, the claim
(P3) in this formulation is always correct. In particular, it is also correct in
Everett’s theory; even if there appear many observers after a measurement,
each of them still obtains a definite record. In fact, the claim (P3) is an
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empirical fact. As a result, the solution to the measurement problem must
deny either the claim (P1) or the claim (P2). If (P1) is correct (as usually
thought), then (P2) must be wrong. In other words, if the mental state of
an observer supervenes on her wave function, then the Schro¨dinger equation
must be revised and the solution to the measurement problem will be along
the direction of dynamical collapse theories. On the other hand, if (P2) is
correct, then (P1) must be wrong. This means that if the wave function
always evolves in accord with the Schro¨dinger equation, then the mental
state of an observer cannot supervene on her wave function. There are two
other forms of psychophysical supervenience. One is that the mental state
of an observer supervenes on certain branches of her wave function, and the
other is that the mental state of an observer supervenes on other additional
variables. The first form corresponds to Everett’s theory, and the second
form Bohm’s theory.
To sum up, the three main solutions to the measurement problem just
correspond to three different forms of psychophysical supervenience. In fact,
there are only three possible physical states on which the mental state of an
observer supervenes, which are (1) the wave function, (2) certain branches
of the wave function, and (3) other additional variables. The question is:
Exactly what physical state does the mental state of an observer supervenes
on? It can be expected that an analysis of this question will help solve the
measurement problem.
3 Everett’s theory
I will first analyze Everett’s theory. The theory claims that for the above
post-measurement state (2) there are two observers, each of who is con-
sciously aware of a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down.
There are in general two ways of understanding the notion of multiplic-
ity in Everett’s theory. One is the strong form which claims that there are
two physical observers (in material content) after the quantum measurement
(e.g. DeWitt and Graham, 1973). As is well known, this view has serious
problems such as violation of mass-energy conservation and inconsistency
with the dynamical equations (Albert and Loewer, 1988). The problem of
inconsistency can also be seen as follows. The existence of many worlds
is only relative to decoherent observers, not relative to non-decoherent ob-
servers, who can measure the whole superposition corresponding to the many
worlds (e.g. by protective measurements) and confirm that there is no in-
crease in the total mass-energy and number of particles. The other way of
understanding the notion of multiplicity is the weak form which claims that
there is one physical observer (in material content), but there are two men-
tal observers or two mental states of the same physical observer, after the
quantum measurement (e.g. Zeh, 1981). Wallace’s (2012) latest formulation
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of Everett’s theory is arguably this view in nature (see also Kent, 2010).2
In order to derive the multiplicity prediction of the weak form of Everett’s
theory, the mental state of a conscious observer cannot always supervene on
her whole physical state. For each of the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M ,
the mental state directly supervenes on the whole physical state. But for
a superposition of these two physical states such as (2), the mental state
does not supervene on the whole physical state; rather, the mental state
supervenes only on a part of the whole physical state, such as one of the two
terms in the superposition (2), so that a physical observer has two distinct
mental states at the same time. This obviously contradicts the common
assumption of psychophysical supervenience, according to which the mental
state of a conscious observer supervenes on her (whole) physical state. Note
that a whole physical state is independent, while any two parts of the state
are not independent; once one part is selected, the other part will be also
fixed. But a mental state is usually assumed to be autonomous. Thus it is
arguably that a mental state supervenes on a whole physical state, not on
any part of the state.
Although one may object that this common assumption may be invalid in
the quantum domain, one needs to explain why the assumption applies to the
physical states |up〉M and |down〉M , but not to any superposition of them.
This is similar to the preferred basis problem. It seems that the only differ-
ence one can think is that being in the superposition the physical observer
has no definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience
about the measurement result, while being in each branch of the superpo-
sition, |up〉M or |down〉M , she has a definite mental state which contains a
definite conscious experience about the measurement result. However, it has
been argued that under the common assumption of psychophysical superve-
nience, a physical observer being in a post-measurement superposition such
as (2) also has a definite mental state which contains a definite conscious
experience about the measurement result (Gao, 2016), and thus this differ-
ence may not exist. Note that these analyses also apply to the single-mind
theory and the many-minds theory.
Finally, I will give a brief comment on the relationship between Ev-
erett’s theory and decoherence. It is usually thought that the appearance or
emergence of two observers after a quantum measurement with two possible
results is caused by decoherence. However, even if this claim is true for the
strong form of Everett’s theory, it seems that it cannot be true for the weak
form of the theory. The reason is that the generation of a superposed state
of a physical observer (e.g. a superposition of two physical states |up〉M and
|down〉M ), as well as the psychophysical supervenience, have nothing to do
2Note that in Wallace’s formulation it is claimed that there are also two emergent
physical observers, but their existence is only in the sense of branch structure (i.e. the
structure of certain parts of a whole physical state), not in the sense of material content.
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with decoherence. In this sense, the weak form of Everett’s theory is more
like a many-minds theory than a many-worlds theory.
In addition, resorting to decoherence seems to cause a further difficulty
for the application of the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. Since
decoherence is never perfect, there will be no definite parts of the whole
physical state on which the mental states can supervene. This objection
may apply to Wallace’s (2012) formulation of Everett’s theory, which is
arguably a weak form of the theory. Note again that in the weak form of
Everett’s theory the observer still has a whole physical state after a quantum
measurement. In my opinion, it is the failure to clearly distinguish between
a many-minds theory and a many-worlds theory (or between the weak form
and the strong form of Everett’s theory) in the literature that causes much
confusion in understanding Everett’s theory (see also Kent, 2010).
4 Bohm’s theory
Let us turn to Bohm’s theory. It has been realized that an analysis of psy-
chophysical supervenience in Bohm’s theory is also relevant and necessary
(Brown, 1996). In this theory, there are three possible forms of psychophys-
ical supervenience. The first is that the mental state supervenes on both
the wave function and the additional variables such as positions of Bohmian
particles. The second is that the mental state supervenes on the branch
of the wave function occupied by the Bohmian particles. The third is that
the mental state supervenes only on the (relative) positions of Bohmian
particles.
It can be argued that assuming the first form of psychophysical super-
venience is not consistent with the predictions of standard quantum me-
chanics. The reason is as follows. On the wave function part, the mental
content of an observer being in a superposition like (2) does not correspond
to either branch of the superposition. Then, even although the mental state
of the observer also contains the content corresponding to the positions of
Bohmian particles, the whole content does not correspond to either branch
of the superposition. This also means that Bohm’s theory cannot solve the
measurement problem in this case.
The second form of psychophysical supervenience has been the standard
view until recently, according to which the mental state of an observer be-
ing in a post-measurement superposition like (2) supervenes only on the
branch of the superposition occupied by the Bohmian particles. Indeed,
Bohm initially assumed this form of psychophysical supervenience. He said:
“the packet entered by the apparatus [hidden] variable... determines the
actual result of the measurement, which the observer will obtain when she
looks at the apparatus.” (Bohm, 1952, p.182). In this case, the role of the
Bohmian particles is merely to select the branch from amongst the other
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non-overlapping branches of the superposition. Brown and Wallace (2005)
called this assumption Bohm’s result assumption, and they have presented
some arguments against it (see also Stone, 1994; Brown, 1996; Zeh, 1999;
Lewis, 2007).3 In my view, the main problem with this assumption is that
the occupied branch and other empty branches have the same ontological
status and ability to be supervened by the mental state. Moreover, although
it is imaginable that the Bohmian particles may have influences on the occu-
pied branch, e.g. disabling it from being supervened by the mental state, it
is hardly imaginable that the Bohmian particles have influences on all other
empty branches, e.g. disabling them from being supervened by the mental
state.4
In view of the above problems of the first two forms of psychophysi-
cal supervenience, most Bohmians today seem to support the third form
of psychophysical supervenience (e.g. Holland, 1993, p.334), although they
sometimes did not state it explicitly (e.g. Maudlin, 1995b). At first sight, if
assuming this form of psychophysical supervenience, namely assuming the
mental state supervenes only on the (relative) positions of Bohmian parti-
cles, then it seems that the above problems can be avoided. However, it has
been argued that this assumption is inconsistent with the functionalist ap-
proach to consciousness (Brown and Wallace, 2005; see also Bedard, 1999),5
and moreover, the assumption also leads to a serious problem of allowing
superluminal signaling (Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007).6
Besides these problems, it can be further argued that assuming the third
form of psychophysical supervenience seems inconsistent with the Born rule.7
3According to Brown and Wallace (2005), in the general case, each of the non-
overlapping packets in the final joint-system configuration space wavefunction has the
same credentials for representing a definite measurement outcome as the single packet
does in the predictable case (i.e. the case in which the measured system is in an eigen-
state of the measured observable). The fact that only one of them carries the Bohmian
particles does nothing to remove these credentials from the others, and adding the particles
to the picture does not interfere destructively with the empty packets either.
4There is a further problem with Bohm’s result assumption. Since the non-overlapping
of wavepackets in a post-measurement state is never perfect, it seems in principle impos-
sible to say exactly which wavepacket the Bohmian particles reside in.
5The argument can be summarized as follows. If the functionalist assumption is correct,
for consciousness to supervene on the Bohmian particles but not the wavepackets, the
Bohmian particles must have some functional property that the wavepackets do not share.
But the functional behaviour of the Bohmian particles is arguably identical to that of the
wavepacket in which they reside.
6If the mental state supervenes on the positions of Bohmian particles, then an ob-
server can in principle know the configuration of the Bohmian particles in her brain with
a greater level of accuracy than that defined by the wave function. This will allow super-
luminal signaling and lead to a violation of the no-signalling theorem (Valentini, 1992).
In my view, however, this problem is not as deadly as usually thought, since such super-
luminal signaling may exist in principle, and its existence is not inconsistent with existing
experience either (Gao, 2004).
7Note that this inconsistency problem originates only from the assumption that the
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The argument is as follows. Consider again an observer being in the post-
measurement superposition (2). According to the Born rule, the modulus
squared of the amplitude of each branch of this superposition represents
the probability of obtaining the measurement result corresponding to the
branch. For example, the modulus squared of the amplitude of the branch
|up〉M represents the probability of obtaining the x-spin up result. This
means that the Born rule requires that the possible measurement results
should be correlated with these branches of the superposition.8 Then, in
order that the measurement result is represented by the positions of the
Bohmian particles as required by the third form of psychophysical super-
venience, there must exist a one-to-one correspondence between different
branches of the superposition and different positions of the Bohmian parti-
cles. But, on the one hand, Bohm’s theory does not give such a correspond-
ing relationship, and thus it is at least incomplete when assuming the third
form of psychophysical supervenience. On the other hand, it seems that the
corresponding relationship cannot exist. The reason is that the Bohmian
particles can be in any positions in the region where the corresponding wave
function spreads, which is the whole configuration space in realistic situa-
tions, and thus the Bohmian particles corresponding to one branch of the
superposition can always be in the same positions as the Bohmian particles
corresponding to the other branch of the superposition. In addition, for the
above post-measurement superposition, the spatial parts of the two branches
of the superposition may be symmetrical relative to a certain axis, and thus
by the guiding equation the Bohmian particles corresponding to one branch
may also have the same relative positions as the Bohmian particles corre-
sponding to the other branch.
Finally, I note that the above analysis of psychophysical supervenience
also raises a doubt about the whole strategy of Bohm’s theory to solving
the measurement problem. Why add hidden variables such as positions of
Bohmian particles to quantum mechanics? It has been thought that adding
these variables which have definite values at every instant is enough to ensure
the definiteness of measurement results and further solve the measurement
problem. However, if the mental state cannot supervene on these additional
variables, then even though these variables have definite values at every
instant, they are unable to account for our definite experience and thus do
not help solve the measurement problem.
measurement result is represented by the positions of the Bohmian particles, and it is
independent of the psychophysical connection.
8Note that this requirement is independent of whether the wave function is ontic or
not.
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5 Dynamical collapse theories
I have argued that one will meet some difficulties if assuming the mental state
of an observer supervenes either on certain branches of her wave function or
on other additional variables, and thus it seems that Everett’s and Bohm’s
theories are not promising solutions to the measurement problem. This also
suggests that the mental state of an observer supervenes directly on her wave
function, and dynamical collapse theories may be in the right direction to
solve the measurement problem. In some sense, these arguments can be
seen as a further development of von Neumann’s (1955) argument for the
collapse postulate based on the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism.
However, it has been known that dynamical collapse theories are still
plagued by a few serious problems such as the tails problem (Albert and
Loewer, 1996). In particular, the structured tails problem has not been
solved in a satisfactory way (see McQueen, 2015 and references therein).
The problem is essentially that dynamical collapse theories such as the GRW
theory predicts that the post-measurement state is still a superposition of
different outcome branches with similar structure (although the modulus
squared of the coefficient of one branch is close to one), and they need to
explain why high modulus-squared values are macro-existence determiners
(McQueen, 2015). In my view, the key to solving the structured tails prob-
lem is not to analyze the connection between high modulus-squared values
and macro-existence, but to analyze the connection between these values
and our experience of macro-existence, which requires us to further analyze
how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function.
Admittedly this is an unsolved, difficult issue, but I will give a few spec-
ulations here. I conjecture that the mental content of an observer being in a
post-measurement superposition like (2) is composed of the mental content
corresponding to every branch of the superposition, and in particular, the
modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness
of the mental content corresponding to the branch (Gao, 2016). Under this
assumption, when the modulus squared of the amplitude of a branch is close
to zero, the mental content corresponding to the branch will be the least
vivid. It is conceivable that below a certain threshold of vividness an or-
dinary observer or even an ideal observer will not be consciously aware of
the corresponding mental content. Then even though in dynamical collapse
theories the post-measurement state of an observer is still a superposition of
different outcome branches with similar structure, the observer can only be
consciously aware of the mental content corresponding to the branch with
very high amplitude, and the mental content corresponding to the branches
with very low amplitude will not appear in the whole mental content of the
observer. This may solve the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse
theories.
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6 Conclusions
It has been realized that the measurement problem, in the final analysis, is
to explain how the linear quantum dynamics can be compatible with the
existence of definite experiences of conscious observers. This requires that
the physical state representing the measurement result should be also the
physical state on which the mental state of an observer supervenes, thus
introducing an important restriction on the solutions to the measurement
problem. However, the mental aspect of the measurement problem has been
ignored in the conventional formulation of the problem, and a systematic
analysis of psychophysical supervenience in the solutions to the problem
is also missing in the literature. In this paper, I give a new formulation
of the measurement problem which lays more stress on the psychophysical
connection, and analyze whether the three main solutions to the problem,
namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and dynamical collapse theories, can
satisfy the restriction of psychophysical supervenience and thus can indeed
solve the problem. The analysis suggests that dynamical collapse theories
may be in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Finally, I
also propose a possible solution to the structured tails problem of dynamical
collapse theories by a further analysis of psychophysical supervenience.
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